The nation of Turkey will be having a very important constitutional referendum scheduled for the 16th April, 2017. The Turkish Constitutional referendum will restructure the very fabric of the Turkish political system with the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister and the increase of the executive Presidential powers which would also include the extension of the tenure of office for an elected government. Electoral reforms would increase the four year tenure to five years. The Turkish parliamentary membership will increase from the present 550 to 600, although, the executive will be tightened to a Presidential inner circle which will also curtail the military judicial influence from the executive.
The Turkish government's incumbency of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, from the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, (AK Party, or The Justice and Development Party), has been in power for 11 years. The Justice and Development party is considered politically as a pro-Islamic right wing conservative political government which has veered Turkey away from its post 1918 Kemalism (or Ataturkism) and Laicism secularism stance which has been embraced by the Western nations since the end of hostilities in the Great War of 1918 ushering the Ataturkism period of a post Ottoman Empire Turkish political and social culture, that was until the 2002 election, when, paradoxically, the Turkish pro-Islamic political wave swept aside the hitherto, Kemalism and Laicism of post World War One Turkey. In 2002, whilst the world was entering a new era of global terrorism since September 11, 2001, in Turkey, somewhat against the grain, Turkish democracy moved more to the Islamic rightwing and away from the Secularism of the Kemalism and Ataturkism era of over a century of Turkish political history. Erdogan, therefore, was to become the harbinger for an anti-Kemalism executive government structure, which was resisted not by the people, but, paradoxically, by the military themselves, with what would be considered as a failed coup attempt in 2016.
Militarily, the coup was overthrown by the people, politically, however, the seemingly glass house political structure of the present Turkish government was measured by a seemingly ineffectual executive political structure as demonstrably challenged by the recent 2016 attempted coup by some dissdent rank and file within the Turkish Military. In light of this political inefficiency and ineffectiveness, it would be considered pragmatic for a decisive executive structure to articulate down the vertical political process in a control and command process so as to minimise these political inefficiencies. Interpretively, therefore, it was considered important, to have a stronger executive presidency in which emergency powers may not need parliamentary accountability, which may be considered too time consuming and inefficient, particularly in a politically tenuous and fragile environment where the threat variable for the National Security for Turkey is at its highest level. In order to consolidate a fragile power base, it was necessarily to overhaul the political foundations from its very root, through the Constitution itself.
The Constitutional Referendum would be necessary to cement a destabilising political system a contagion being spread from the Middle Eastern Arab Spring virus threatening to infect Turkey from both within its National sovereign borders, its immediate neighbours, and rippling outwardly to include Europe and further. In the immediate outcome of the constitutional referendum, there will be a significant cultural impact upon the Turkish cultural landscape and one in which will be marked as the Erdogan era which will replace the hitherto Kemal Ataturk legacy, which was noted with Laicism and a democratic parliamentary republic process that was palatable to the Occidental world. The Parliamentary Republic of Turkey will be physically increased numerically, but, and the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister (as a member of the cabinet, and, therefore, as a member of the Executive), in actuality, institutional political power, however, for the Turkish National General Assembly (Parliament), will be significantly reduced, when a constitutional restructure will create a more powerful Executive Presidential system within the Turkish political structure. In short, the Presidential powers of the Turkish Devlet Baskani (President), will be increased at the expense of parliamentary accountability.
The ultimate outcome of the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, if the yes vote is successful, will see the Turkish military branch severely punished with limited political influence; and that, the Turkish Parliamentary Republic, whilst it will increase from the current number of 550, to 600, will, at the same time, limit the executive (cabinet) size, and scope, with the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister. The power vested by the Executive President, after the Constitutional Referendum will significantly be increased, which at present will mean that the office of Presidency will rest with the current President, whom has been noted as a pro-Muslim Brotherhood supporter, and, therefore, is an outright pro-Sunni Islamic President whom is anti laicism and anti-Kemalism.
At the hustings
The domestic campaign
The background for the Yes vote, for increasing the Executive Presidency within the Constitutional referendum, has been tempered with a firm pro-Sunni pan-Turkish fervour, as a direct reaction to the 2016 attempted coup, which was a domestic implosion stemming from two significant domestic crisis points, First, the over the border Syrian crisis, and, more directly,the subsequent influx of Syrian refugees, in the millions, attempting to migrate towards Europe, via, Turkey; and, since the collapse of the Ottoman empire, with the perpetual sore, since 1918, with the Kurdish Separatists, and Kurdish Nationalists, which has led to domestic violence, and, in a very likely direct conflict between the PKK, YPG, and inadvertently, an imminent clash with the Peshmerga (Kurdish forces).
Externalised from the immediate domestic crisis for the Turkish government, is the over the border military and political geo-political and geo-military confrontations, that would involve direct NATO and Russian confrontations, as a member of NATO, Turkey is the only NATO member nation which has had direct military contact with the Russian military with 24th November, 2015, shootdown of a Russian SU-24, by a Turkish F16. The Russian Turkish adverse relationship was further exacerbated with the Russian's ambassador to Turkey, His Excellency Andrei Karlov's assassination in late 2016, by a purportedly pro-Aleppo and therefore an IS sympathiser Assassin assigned as the Russian's Ambassador's personal protection security detail.
The Russians Syrian crisis campaign has been a line in the sand moment for Turkish-Russian relations, which has been on breaking point with the Russian foreign policy stance of supporting the Assad regime which is a pro-Shia Syrian Government platform, which has seen in Turkey an outright anti-Russian attitude, by the Turkish military and a pro-Sunni Erdogan administration. Although, in saying this Sunni leaning Islamic governmental stance by the Turkish government, the Erdogan administration has vehemently distanced themselves from the Imam Bagdadi's led Daesh, or Islamic State, although, the IS have declared themselves as a Sunni Caliphate, and, that the Turkish government has listed the Islamic State (IS or Daesh) as a Terrorist Organisation, the pro-Hezbollah, pro-Alawite, and, therefore, pro-Shia Syrian Assad regime, has been considered as the lesser of the two evils by the Russians. This foreign policy stance by the Russians according to Erdogan's AK government, as a line in the sand, in which has been crossed over by the Russians. and one in which will see an irreconciliable difference in foreign policy objectives by Turkey and Russia.
Oversea's campaign for the Turkish Constitutional Referendum.
The pan-Turkmanism was the global diaspora of the Turkman and to shore up domestic ascent the Turkish expatriate Turkmen citizenry with enfranchisement rights is still considered a significant voter group. The Constitutional Referendum for both the Yes and No campaign were in the hustings throughout Europe in order to shore up expatriate support for either the yes or no vote.
A mea Culpa for Pan Turkish Ottomanism.
On March 11, 2017, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, was attempting to initiate a pro-yes rally campaign in Rotterdam, Netherlands, but, was prevented from entering the country for previous political comments made by the Minister, with regards to the alleged mistreatment of Turkish emigres as a non-EU and non-Schengen Aquis member within Europe, whose citizens continue to have settlement difficulties within the Netherlands. The Turkish Minister was forced detour his pro-yes campaign efforts to France instead.
Meanwhile, the Turkish admission into the European Union membership status has had a slight obstacle by way of the Erdogan anti-Laicism and pro-Islamic administration. The Islamic nation within NATO has also meant that differences of opinion will arise from time to time and certainly with the present Erdogan administration the NATO chain of command within the Turkish military circles has presented its own domestic unrest which has culminated with the 2016 coup attempt. What has started as a preventative measure by European nations of potential domestic divisions amongst the Turkish communities within Europe over the oncoming Constitutional Referendum may spark a Nationalism rally by the pan-Turkish movement globally in shoring support for ex-patriates against their respective European host nations anti-Turkish xenophobia. Perhaps, a period has arisen whereby the Turkish people within Europe may feel the chagrine ire of xenophobic Europeans of their Islamic culture and perhaps significantly, a mea culpa political crisis that will strain the multiculturalism harmonious homeostasis which has allowed for the international inclusion of many cultures and nationalities to freely move, integrate, and cooperate economically, culturally, and politically unrestrained by xenophobic resentment and presenting a security threat to their fellow citizenry.
With the banning of the Turkish Foreign Minister from the Netherlands, and the subsequent indignant reaction from Turkey's conservative government and most significantly by the Turkish people, globally, the supporters for Erdogan and the his blend of pan-Turkmanship patriotism and chauvinism has tempered a nascent revision of Kemalism politics, and, a reversion to Ottomanism and the granduer of the Ottoman Empire by the Turkmen being revisited by the current Erdogan administration.
The outcome of the April 16th, 2017, Constitutional Referendum, will confirm the present attitude of the Turkish people. If it is yes, then the nascent rise of the Ottomanism and pan Islamism of the Erdogan era has arisen to its zenith and the Kemal Ataturk Laicism and particurly for the ANZACs, in that the memory of the post-Gallipoli era will be undone.
History will recall the outcome of the April 16th, 2017, Turkey Constitutional Referendum event, as a focal point in the demise of the Laicism and the return of pan-Turkish Ottomanism or the retention of the status quo, of Parliamentary Republicanism, and the continuation of Kemal Ataturk Laicism?
By Tim Tufuga
20th March, 2017
Source:
1. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, wikipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mevl%C3%BCt_%C3%87avu%C5%9Fo%C4%9Flu
2. Turkish Constitutional Referendum, 2017, wikipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turkish_constitutional_referendum,_2017
3. Turkish Coup, 2016, wikipedia.com https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Turkish_coup_d'%C3%A9tat_attempt
4. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, wikipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_Erdo%C4%9Fan
5. Kemalism, wkipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kemalism
6. Turkey's downing of Russian plane, BBC.com, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581, 1st December, 2015
7. Andrei Karlov's assassination, news.com.au, http://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/russian-ambassador-to-ankara-gunned-down-during-art-gallery-visit/news-story/8678761871fa963d07d62ca83dc8caf8, 20 December, 2016.
8. Tensions rise in Europe, telegraph.com.uk, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/17/erdogan-calls-turkish-families-have-five-children-bulwark-against/, 17th March, 2017.
